1. Background

The Treasury Management Strategy for Bromsgrove District Council has been underpinned by the adoption of the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy's (CIPFA) Code of Practice on Treasury Management 2009, which includes the requirement for determining a treasury strategy on the likely financing and investment activity for the forthcoming financial year.

The Code also recommends that members are informed of Treasury Management activities at least twice a year. This report therefore ensures this authority is embracing Best Practice in accordance with CIPFA's recommendations.

Treasury management is defined as: "The management of the local authority's investments and cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks."

2. Economic Background

Growth: Global growth prospects deteriorated considerably over the six months to September, moving from an expectation of modest expansion to the risk of a double-dip recession. Q1 2011 GDP in the UK was 0.5% but was just 0.2% in Q2. Even economies like Germany's, which were hitherto seemingly strong, began to flounder with growth registering 0.1% in Q2.

Inflation: Inflation remained stubbornly high. Annual CPI for August was 4.5%; CPI had remained above MPC's 3% upper limit for 20 consecutive months and required the Bank of England's Governor to write his seventh open letter to the Chancellor. The Bank believed the elevated rate of inflation reflected the temporary impact of several factors: the increase in the VAT rate to 20%, past increases in global energy prices and import prices.

Employment / Consumer Confidence: Weakness persisted in the labour market. Job creation was unable to absorb the 90,000 quarterly growth in jobseekers, particularly those in the 16-20 age bracket. Unemployment on the ILO measure rose to 7.9%. High inflation trumping average earnings growth of only 2.9%, scarce availability of credit, stagnant house prices, all combined to lower disposable income, squeeze household spending power and leave consumer confidence fragile.

Central bankers' policies were driven by the feeble growth outlook rather than the upward trend in inflation. The Bank of England's August Inflation Report downgraded the growth forecast even as it acknowledged energy price rises could push CPI to 5% before inflation fell back to the 2% target over the medium-term. The UK's strategy of combining loose monetary policy (the Bank Rate had remained at 0.5% for $2\frac{1}{2}$ years and Quantitative Easing at £200bn) with tight fiscal policy supported the rebalancing of the economy and also commanded support in the markets.

The protracted and unseemly political impasse to resolve the US debt ceiling issue turned a debate into a debacle. A lack of both political governance and measures to address the high debt burden (put off until after the 2012 presidential election), ultimately led Standard & Poor's to downgrade the US Sovereign from AAA to AA+. The country's weak economic and fiscal situation and an unemployment rate of 9.1% left the Federal Reserve little option but to commit to "exceptionally low" interest rates until mid 2013.

The European sovereign debt crisis deepened. The agreement in July to address Greece's fiscal problems and broaden the mandate for the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) only bought

time for the Eurozone as market pressure increased on Italy and Spain, but did little to address the issue of overburdened sovereign balance sheets.

The European Banking Authority released the results of the second of its stress tests in July. 8 banks (two Greek, one Austrian and five small domestic Spanish banks) out of 91 banks failed the tests. All of the UK and non-UK banks tested by the EBA and which are on the Council's lending list met the 'stressed' Core Tier 1 Ratio of 5%, none were adjudged as 'near-failed'(i.e. having ratios between 5% and 6%).

Gilt yields and money market rates: The economic uncertainty resulted in analysts postponing the likelihood of an increase in the UK Bank Rate until mid 2012. Gilts were considered a safe haven and benefited from market turmoil. Gilt yields fell to their lowest levels in five years. 5-year gilt yields fell to 1.25%, 10-year yields to 2.2% and 20-year yields to 3.05%.

PWLB borrowing rates fell commensurately (the Board maintained the +0.90% margin above the equivalent gilt yield for new borrowing).

There was very little change to Libor and Libid rates as at 30/09/2011, the differential between 0.1% to 0.2% for maturities up to 12 months.

4. Investment Activity

The Guidance on Local Government Investments in England gives priority to security and liquidity and the Council's aim is to achieve a yield commensurate with these principles.

Investments

	Balance on 01/04/2011 £000s	Investments Made £000s	Investments Repaid £000s	Balance on 30/09/2011 £000s	Increase/ Decrease in Investments
Short Term Investments	12,575	38,425	36,000	15,000	2,425
TOTAL INVESTMENTS	12,575	38,425	36,000	15,000	2,425

Security of capital has remained the Council's main investment objective. This has been maintained by following the Council's counterparty policy as set out in its Treasury Management Strategy Statement for 2011/12. New investments can be made with the following institutions/instruments:

- Other Local Authorities;
- AAA-rated Stable Net Asset Value Money Market Funds;
- Deposits with UK Banks and Building Societies systemically important to the UK banking system and deposits with select non-UK Banks (Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and the USA);
- Deposits with the DMADF;
- Treasury Bills;
- Bonds issued by Multilateral Development Banks, such as the European Investment Bank
- Pooled funds (collective investment schemes) meeting the criteria in SI 2004 No 534 and subsequent amendments.

Counterparty credit quality is assessed and monitored with reference to: Credit Ratings (the Council's minimum long-term counterparty rating of A+ (or equivalent) across rating agencies Fitch, S&P and Moody's); credit default swaps; GDP of the country in which the institution

operates; the country's net debt as a percentage of GDP; sovereign support mechanisms /potential support from a well-resourced parent institution; share price.

Credit Risk

Counterparty credit quality has progressively strengthened/been maintained through the first half of the year, as can be demonstrated by the Credit Score Analysis summarised below:

Date	Value Weighted Average - Credit Risk Score	Value Weighted Average - Credit Rating	Time Weighted Average - Credit Risk Score	Time Weighted Average - Credit Rating
31/03/2011	4.23	AA-	4.33	AA-
30/06/2011	3.99	AA-	4.01	AA-
30/09/2011	3.83	AA-	3.84	AA-

Scoring:

- -Value weighted average reflects the credit quality of investments according to the size of the deposit
- -Time weighted average reflects the credit quality of investments according to the maturity of the deposit
- -AAA = highest credit quality = 1
- D = lowest credit quality = 15

Counterparty Update

Maturity Limits

The lack of real progress in resolving the sovereign debt crisis in Europe began to affect even the stronger Eurozone nations and their banking systems. Market volatility, as measured by the VIX index, spiked sharply in August, banks' share prices fell sharply. Having reviewed all credit indicators the Council, advised by Arlingclose, believed that there were no solvency issues with the banks on the recommended lending list. Nevertheless the share price moves were too sharp to ignore and a prudent response to the tensions and negativity in the markets was required.

The Council responded to the growing stress by scaling back maturities for new investments on the advice of the Council's treasury advisors. Limits for UK banks, Nationwide BS and Australian, Canadian and US banks have now been temporarily reduced to 6 months (Santander UK plc to is restricted to 3 months). Limits for European banks have been temporarily reduced to 1 month. French institutions have been suspended for new investments in response to concerns over funding and their sovereign exposure to peripheral European nations.

On 28th September Clydesdale Bank was suspended from the lending list following the bank's downgrade to A2 by Moody's, which falls below the Council's minimum criteria of A+ or equivalent. *If applicable*: On advice from Arlingclose, the Council's existing term deposit with the bank will be held until maturity on <date>.

During the first quarter Moody's placed the ratings of a number of UK institutions on review for possible downgrade. This is to align their ratings with evolving systemic support post credit crisis. The review is likely to be completed sometime in October and may lead to downgrades of some counterparties on the Council's lending list. The implications of any downgrades will be discussed with Arlingclose and could result in a review of the Council's minimum credit criteria, as set out in its Treasury Management Strategy Statement.

Please amend as applicable: Until early September, where cash-flow permitted the Council followed a cautious investment strategy of a rolling programme of 6 month deposits with named

⁻Aim = A+ or higher credit rating, with a score of 5 or lower, to reflect current investment approach with main focus on security

counterparties for a proportion of its investments. Longer-dated AAA investments such as bonds issued by the European Investment Bank and World Bank were only borderline in their attractiveness (yields for 3-year EIB bonds fell from 2.2% in April to 1.2% by the end of September).

Budgeted Income and Outturn

The Council's budgeted investment income for the year has been estimated at £68k.

The UK Bank Rate has been maintained at 0.5% since March 2009 and not expected to rise until the end of 2012. Short-term money market rates have remained at very low levels (see Table 1 in Appendix 2). New deposits were made at an average rate of 0.5%. The Council anticipates an investment outturn of £68k% for the whole year.

5. Compliance with Prudential Indicators

The Council can confirm that it has complied with its Prudential Indicators for 2011/12, which were set in March 2011 as part of the Council's Treasury Management Strategy Statement.

6. Outlook for Q3-Q4

At the time of writing this activity report in XXXX 2011, given the precarious outlook for growth it is believed the Bank of England would only raise rates after there was firm evidence that the economy had survived the fiscal consolidation. Therefore, the outlook is for official interest rates to remain low for an extended period, at least until late 2012.

	Sep-11	Dec-11	Mar-12	Jun-12	Sep-12	Dec-12	Mar-13	Jun-13	Sep-13	Dec-13	Mar-14	Jun-14	Sep-14
Official Bank Rate													
Upside risk				0.25	0.25	0.25	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50
Central case	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.75	0.75	1.00	1.25	1.50	1.75	2.00	2.25
Downside risk						-0.25	-0.25	-0.50	-0.50	-0.50	-0.50	-0.50	-0.50

7. Summary

In compliance with the requirements of the CIPFA Code of Practice this report provides members with a summary report of the treasury management activity during the first quarter of 2011/12. As indicated in this report none of the Prudential Indicators have been breached and a prudent approach has been taking in relation to investment activity with priority being given to security and liquidity over yield.

8. Other Information

Capital Financing Requirement

Estimates of the Council's cumulative maximum external borrowing requirement for 2011/12 to 2013/14 are shown in the table below:

	31/03/2011 Actual £000s	31/03/2012 Estimate £000s	31/03/2013 Estimate £000s	31/03/2014 Estimate £000s
Capital Financing Requirement	0	0	0	907
Cumulative Maximum External Borrowing Requirement	0	0	0	907

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In the Prudential Code (November 2009), it states¹ 'Where there is a significant difference between the net and gross borrowing position the risks and benefits associated with this strategy should be clearly stated in the annual strategy.' *If applicable, please set out here*:

- Reasons that gross borrowing levels exceeding the CFR
- Reasons for the Council's large cash balances, e.g. capital receipts from LSVT/Reserves/cash held on behalf of pension fund/school balances/cashflow balances)

Balances and Reserves

Estimates of the Council's level of Balances and Reserves for 2011/12 to 2013/14 are as follows:

	31/03/2011	31/03/2012	31/03/2013	31/03/2014
	Actual	Estimate	Estimate	Estimate
	£000s	£000s	£000s	£000s
Balances and Reserves	5,208	3,190	2,203	2,079

Prudential Indicator Compliance

(a) Authorised Limit and Operational Boundary for External Debt

- The Local Government Act 2003 requires the Council to set an Affordable Borrowing Limit, irrespective of their indebted status. This is a statutory limit which should not be breached.
- The Council's Affordable Borrowing Limit was set at £3.5m for 2011/12.
- The Operational Boundary is based on the same estimates as the Authorised Limit but reflects the most likely, prudent but not worst case scenario without the additional headroom included within the Authorised Limit.
- The Operational Boundary for 2011/12 was set at £2.5m.
- The Executive Director for Finance and Resources confirms that there were no breaches to the Authorised Limit and the Operational Boundary during the year.

(b) Upper Limits for Fixed Interest Rate Exposure and Variable Interest Rate Exposure

- These indicators allow the Council to manage the extent to which it is exposed to changes in interest rates.
- The upper limit for variable rate exposure allows for the use of variable rate debt to offset exposure to changes in short-term rates on our portfolio of investments.

	Limits for 2011/12 £ / %
Upper Limit for Fixed Rate Exposure	100%
Compliance with Limits:	Yes
Upper Limit for Variable Rate Exposure	100%
Compliance with Limits:	Yes

(c) Maturity Structure of Fixed Rate Borrowing

• This indicator is to limit large concentrations of fixed rate debt needing to be replaced at times of uncertainty over interest rates.

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¹ Prudential Code, November 2009, page 4, paragraph E19

Maturity Structure of Fixed Rate Borrowing	Upper Limit %	Lower Limit %	Actual Fixed Rate Borrowing as at 30/09/11	Borrowing as	•
Under 12 months	100%	0%	0	0	Yes
12 months and within 24 months	100%	0%	0	0	Yes
24 months and within 5 years	100%	0%	0	0	Yes
5 years and within 10 years	100%	0%	0	0	Yes
10 years and above	100%	0%	0	0	Yes

(d) Total principal sums invested for periods longer than 364 days

- This indicator allows the Council to manage the risk inherent in investments longer than 364 days.
- The limit for 2011/12 was set at £2.0m.
- The Council's policy response since the onset of the credit crunch in 2007 was to keep investment maturities to a maximum of 12 months. There are no investments made for a period greater than 364 days during this period.

Appendix 2

Money Market Data and PWLB Rates

The average, low and high rates correspond to the rates during the financial year and rather than those in the tables below

Table 1: Bank Rate, Money Market Rates

Date	Bank Rate	O/N LIBID	7-day LIBID	1- month LIBID	3- month LIBID	6- month LIBID	12- month LIBID	2-yr SWAP Bid	3-yr SWAP Bid	5-yr SWAP Bid
01/04/2011	0.50	0.40	0.54	0.54	0.69	1.12	1.59	1.89	2.36	3.00
30/04/2011	0.50	0.50	0.40	0.49	0.69	1.05	1.52	1.62	2.07	2.74
31/05/2011	0.50	0.40	0.40	0.52	0.69	1.08	1.56	1.53	1.89	2.54
30/06/2011	0.50	0.50	0.40	0.50	0.77	1.06	1.54	1.44	1.82	2.50
30/07/2011	0.50	0.40	0.40	0.50	0.78	1.07	1.55	1.29	1.53	2.09
31/08/2011	0.50	0.40	0.40	0.56	0.86	1.15	1.63	1.27	1.43	1.92
30/09/2011	0.50	0.60	0.60	0.54	0.92	1.21	1.69	1.25	1.38	1.75
Average	0.50	0.41	0.43	0.53	0.77	1.10	1.58	1.42	1.71	2.29
Maximum	0.50	0.60	0.60	0.58	0.92	1.21	1.69	1.95	2.42	3.07
Minimum	0.50	0.40	0.35	0.49	0.68	1.01	1.40	1.08	1.23	1.60
Spread	0.00	0.20	0.25	0.09	0.24	0.20	0.29	0.87	1.19	1.46

Table 2: PWLB Borrowing Rates - Fixed Rate, Maturity Loans

Change Date	Notice No	1 year	4½-5 yrs	9½-10 yrs	19½-20 yrs	29½-30 yrs	39½-40 yrs	49½-50 yrs
01/04/2011	128/11	1.93	3.66	4.81	5.33	5.35	5.31	5.28
28/04/2011	162/11	1.73	3.45	4.61	5.18	5.21	5.17	5.14
31/05/2011	202/11	1.64	3.21	4.43	5.08	5.12	5.09	5.07
30/06/2011	246/11	1.61	3.09	4.42	5.17	5.21	5.20	5.18
29/07/2011	288/11	1.52	2.75	4.06	4.97	5.07	5.06	5.04
31/08/2011	332/11	1.48	2.50	3.71	4.66	4.84	4.87	4.85
30/09/2011	375/11	1.49	2.41	3.49	4.36	4.62	4.70	4.70
	Low	1.42	2.18	3.31	4.24	4.49	4.55	4.54
	Average	1.59	2.92	4.15	4.94	5.04	5.04	5.01
	High	1.97	3.73	4.89	5.41	5.42	5.39	5.35

Table 3: PWLB Repayment Rates - Fixed Rate, Maturity Loans

Change Date	Notice No	1 year	4½-5 yrs	9½-10 yrs	19½-20 yrs	29½-30 yrs	39½-40 yrs	49½-50 yrs
01/04/2011	128/11	0.82	2.37	3.62	4.21	4.24	4.16	4.10
28/04/2011	162/11	0.62	2.16	3.42	4.06	4.10	4.02	3.96
31/05/2011	202/11	0.53	1.93	3.23	3.97	4.01	3.94	3.90
30/06/2011	246/11	0.50	1.80	3.22	4.05	4.10	4.05	4.01
29/07/2011	288/11	0.41	1.48	2.86	3.84	3.95	3.91	3.87
31/08/2011	332/11	0.37	1.25	2.50	3.53	3.73	3.72	3.68
30/09/2011	375/11	0.38	1.17	2.30	3.23	3.51	3.55	3.53

Low	0.31	0.95	2.10	3.10	3.37	3.40	3.37
Average	0.48	1.65	2.95	3.82	3.93	3.89	3.84
High	0.86	2.44	3.71	4.29	4.31	4.23	4.18

Table 4: PWLB Borrowing Rates - Fixed Rate, Equal Instalment of Principal (EIP) Loans

Change Date	Notice No	4½-5 yrs	9½-10 yrs	19½-20 yrs	29½-30 yrs	39½-40 yrs	49½-50 yrs
01/04/2011	128/11	2.76	3.74	4.84	5.22	5.33	5.36
28/04/2011	162/11	2.55	3.53	4.64	5.05	5.18	5.22
31/05/2011	202/11	2.37	3.30	4.46	4.93	5.09	5.12
30/06/2011	246/11	2.25	3.17	4.46	4.99	5.17	5.22
29/07/2011	288/11	2.01	2.83	4.11	4.73	4.97	5.06
31/08/2011	332/11	1.88	2.57	3.75	4.38	4.67	4.80
30/09/2011	375/11	1.84	2.48	3.53	4.08	4.37	4.54
	Low	1.67	2.24	3.35	3.93	4.25	4.41
	Average	2.17	3.00	4.19	4.73	4.95	5.02
	High	2.82	3.82	4.92	5.30	5.41	5.44

Table 5: PWLB Repayment Rates - Equal Instalment of Principal (EIP) Loans

Change Date	Notice No	4½-5 yrs	9½-10 yrs	19½-20 yrs	29½-30 yrs	39½-40 yrs	49½-50 yrs
01/04/2011	128/11	1.54	2.55	3.70	4.10	4.22	4.25
28/04/2011	162/11	1.33	2.34	3.50	3.91	4.07	4.11
31/05/2011	202/11	1.16	2.10	3.32	3.81	3.97	4.01
30/06/2011	246/11	1.04	1.98	3.31	3.87	4.06	4.11
29/07/2011	288/11	0.82	1.64	2.95	3.60	3.86	3.94
31/08/2011	332/11	0.70	1.39	2.60	3.25	3.55	3.68
30/09/2011	375/11	0.67	1.30	2.38	2.95	3.25	3.42
	Low	0.51	1.07	2.20	2.80	3.13	3.30
	Average	0.97	1.81	3.04	3.60	3.83	3.91
	High	1.59	2.62	3.78	4.18	4.30	4.33

Table 6: PWLB Variable Rates

	1-M Rate	3-M Rate	6-M Rate	1-M Rate	3-M Rate	6-M Rate
	Pre-CSR	Pre-CSR	Pre-CSR	Post-CSR	Post-CSR	Post-CSR
01/04/2011	0.67	0.77	0.89	1.57	1.67	1.79
28/04/2011	0.67	0.71	0.79	1.57	1.61	1.69
31/05/2011	0.66	0.70	0.76	1.56	1.60	1.66
30/06/2011	0.65	0.68	0.71	1.55	1.58	1.61
30/07/2011	0.65	0.67	0.69	1.55	1.57	1.59
31/08/2011	0.65	0.66	0.68	1.55	1.56	1.58
30/09/2011	0.65	0.65	0.66	1.55	1.55	1.56
Low	0.65	0.65	0.65	1.55	1.55	1.55
Average	0.66	0.69	0.72	1.56	1.59	1.62
High	0.69	0.79	0.91	1.59	1.69	1.81